Energy Economics, Winter Semester 2021-2
Lecture 12: Carbon Markets

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Introduction to Climate Damages

Global Warming Damages

Global warming causes net damages to ecosystems and economies. The costs of some of these damages (and benefits) can be quantified, although uncertainties both about the climate impacts and the economic consequences are high. Damages occur over **hundreds of years**.

Direct costs:

- **Weather extremes** impact agriculture and built environment (hurricanes, heatwaves, drought, flooding, fires)

- **Rising sea levels** increase flood damage, make large areas uninhabitable

- **Crop/livestock losses** due to rising average temperatures

- **Biodiversity loss** due to changing habitats

- **Expansion of deserts** makes land uninhabitable

- **Reduction of drinking water** due to changing precipitation

Adaptation costs:

- **Dams and levees** against rising sea

- **Resilience measures** for infrastructure

- **Air conditioning** in buildings

- **Mass migration** from hot regions

- **Crop changes**

Climate Breakdown: Tipping Points

The 2015 Paris Agreement pledged its signatories to 'pursue efforts to limit [global warming above pre-industrial levels] to **1.5°C**' and hold 'the increase...to **well below 2°C**'. These targets were chosen to avoid potentially irreversible **tipping points** in the Earth's systems.

WAIS: West Antarctic Ice Sheet ($\Rightarrow$ 5m sea level rise)

Greenland (7m)

THC: thermohaline circulation (warms Europe)

ENSO: El Niño–Southern Oscillation (extreme weather)

EAIS: East Antarctic Ice Sheet (> 50 m)

3

We can attempt to quantify the net damages as a **Social Cost of Carbon** in €/tCO_2. These damages depend strongly on what damages are included, the discount rate (how we weight damages in the future), total emissions and the year of emission. Values in the literature range widely! Example from German Environment Agency (UBA):

Tabelle 1:   UBA-Empfehlung zu den Klimakosten in €$_{2020}$ / t CO$_{2\,äq}$

|	Klimakosten in €$_{2020}$ / t CO$_{2\,äq}$		
	2020	**2030**	**2050**
1% reine Zeitpräferenzrate	195	215	250
0% reine Zeitpräferenzrate	680	700	765

Quelle: Eigene Darstellung.

0% discount rate $\Rightarrow$ future generations weighted same as current.

1% discount rate $\Rightarrow$ damages in 30 years weighted by $\frac{1}{1.01^{30}} = 0.74$.

Air pollution from fossil fuel burning is linked to higher mortality (deaths) and morbidity (diseases, e.g. aggravation of asthma).

Source: World Health Organisation

Global Warming as a 'Negative Externality'

The unabated use of fossil fuels has an unintended indirect effect on third parties: the emissions of CO_2 lead to climate costs for current and future generations, an **externality**.

Definitions:

- **Emissions** are released by a facility into the environment; can include substances, noise, odours, radiation.

- **External effects** are impacts of economic activities on outsiders without compensation. In the case of damages, these impacts are **negative** external effects; if the impacts are advantageous, they are called **positive** external effects.

- **External cost** is the negative external effects expressed in monetary units.

Examples of negative externalities: cigarette smoke in indoor spaces; oil spills; soot damage on people and buildings; nuclear accidents; noisy traffic/neighbours.

Examples of positive externalities: dyke benefits many; peace benefits whole world; education is good for society; art; keeping honey bees next to apple orchard.

- **Globality**: The location of emissions does not matter (leakage problem)

- **Timeline**: Damages affect future generations while the current generation has relatively minor impairments

- **Cost/unavailability** of reliable abatement technologies for hard-to-debarbonise sectors (like aviation, shipping, cement and petrochemicals)

- **Free-rider problem**: Solutions require an internationally coordinated and future-oriented approach: Who should provide what contributions? (International and intra-national distributive conflicts; developing countries against grandfathering)

- **Measurement, reporting and verification**

Strategies for Negative Externalities

Profits versus External Costs

Suppose a company's profits Π depend on their emissions Em. There are external costs $C_{ext}(Em)$ borne by a third party.

Profit Π
External Costs C_{ext}

Maximize $\Pi(Em) - C_{ext}(Em)$

External Costs C_{ext}

$C_{ext,0}$

Π^*

Π_0

Profit Π

0 Em^* Em_0 Emissions Em

- If external costs are ignored, profits reach maximum at Π_0 with emissions Em_0. External costs $C_{ext}(Em_0)$ are higher than firm's profits - inefficient from a societal perspective - a **market failure**.

- If instead we maximise for **society** $\Pi(Em) - C_{ext}(Em)$ we find an optimum at Em^* where external costs are lower than profits. The company can compensate the third party for their costs.

8

Now consider the marginal costs and profits.

If we find the emissions level that maximises profits minus costs, i.e. the benefit for the whole society:

$$\max_{Em} \left[\Pi(Em) - C_{ext}(Em) \right]$$

then at the optimum we have **marginal external costs** equal **marginal abatement costs** (cost to firm in lost profits):

$$\frac{d\Pi}{dEm} - \frac{dC_{ext}}{dEm} = 0$$

There are three major strategies for dealing with negative externalities:

- **Standards/norms**: Society sets voluntary or binding requirements for maximum emissions levels. Example: for 2020-2024 there is an EU fleet-wide CO2 emission **target** for passenger cars of 95 gCO_2/km. Example: insulation standards for new/renovated buildings. Example: efficiency standards/ratings for fridges/TVs.

- **Pigouvian tax**: Tax the externality (e.g. CO_2 emissions) to internalise the social costs of the externality. Example: German CO_2 tax on oil and gas in transport and heating. Example: cigarette tax.

- **Cap-and-Trade System**: Set a volume limit on the externality (e.g. CO_2 emissions), distribute certificates for the volume and require polluters to purchase certificates. Example: EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) for CO_2 energy, industry and domestic aviation. Example: US sulphur dioxide (SO_2) Allowance Trading System.

Pigou (1931) suggested to tax negative externalities so that producers can internalise the external costs they cause, and thereby reduce production to the socially most efficient level.

Suppose we set a tax λ on CO_2 emissions in €/tCO_2.

Now the producer optimises:

$$\max_{Em} \Pi(Em) - \lambda \cdot Em$$

So that at the optimal point:

$$\frac{d\Pi}{dEm} - \lambda = 0$$

In other words: they reduce their emissions until the marginal abatement cost (i.e. the cost to the company of reducing the next tonne of CO_2) is equal to the tax.

(NB: Compared to the socially optimal solution, we have replaced nonlinear external costs $C_{ext}(Em)$ with a linear function for the firm $\lambda \cdot Em$.)

Pigouvian Tax

Under a Pigouvian tax, the optimal solution is to reduce emissions until the marginal abatement cost is equal to the tax λ. The exact volume of emissions can be implicitly derived if you know λ and the shape of the marginal abatement cost curve.

Example Marginal Abatement Cost Curve for 2030

Consider this example marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve for the whole world for the year 2030.

FIG. 1: MCKINSEY'S GLOBAL COST CURVE FOR THE YEAR 2030

Source: Nauclér, T. and P. A. Enkvist (2009)

Suppose a firm has emissions of 100,000 tCO_2/a based on a fossil-fueled furnace emitting 50,000 tCO_2/a and consuming coal of 100 GWh_{th}/a, and a coal electricity generator emitting 50,000 tCO_2/a and generating 50 GWh_{el}/a. Coal costs 10 €/MWh_{th} and coal electricity LCOE is 40 €/MWh_{el}.

It has the following options:

- Insulate the fossil-fueled furnace at an annualised cost of 50,000 €/a, which reduces coal use by 20 GWh_{th}/a and emissions by 10,000 tCO2/a.

- Replace coal generator with cost including fuel of 2 million €/a, generation of 50 GWh_{el}/a and emissions of 50,000 tCO_2, with a solar-battery combination with cost of 3 million €/a (LCOE of 60 €/MWh_{el}).

- Replace remaining 80 GWh_{th}/a coal for furnace generator with cost of 0.8 million €/a with green hydrogen at cost of 90 €/MWh_{th}.

What does the MAC curve look like?

14

- Insulation: 10,000 tCO_2/a reduction at net cost of (50,000 - 200,000) €/a = -150,000 €/a $\Rightarrow$ MAC of -15 €/tCO_2.

- Clean generation: 50,000 tCO_2/a reduction at net cost of (3-2) million €/a = 1 million €/a $\Rightarrow$ MAC of 20 €/tCO_2.

- Clean heating fuel for furnace: 40,000 tCO_2/a reduction at net cost of $(90 - 10)$€/$MWh_{th}\cdot$ 80 GWh_{th}/a = 6.4 million €/a $\Rightarrow$ 160 €/tCO_2.

What would the firm do with a tax of 10€/tCO_2? 100 €/tCO_2? 200 €/tCO_2?

Cap-and-Trade System

For Pigouvian tax, price is known, volume is unknown. For Cap-and-Trade we fix known volume for emission certificates, then an implicit price is found by trading the certificates.

Cap-and-Trade System

Suppose two companies with different MAC(Em) curves are allotted allowances Em_1 and Em_2. Since $MAC_1(Em_1)$ is lower than that $MAC_2(Em_2)$, the first company has an **arbitrage opportunity**: it reduces its emissions to $Em_1 - \delta$ and sells the corresponding δ emission certificates to company 2 at a cost above $MAC_1(Em_1 - \delta)$. As long as $MAC_1(Em_1 - \delta) < MAC_2(Em_2 + \delta)$, both companies will profit from this transaction. Trading reaches equilibrium at $MAC_1(Em_1 - \delta) = MAC_2(Em_2 + \delta)$.

Marginal abatement cost of company 1 [EUR/t CO_2]

Reduction of company 1

Em_1 CO_2 emissions [t]

Marginal abatement cost of company 2 [EUR/t CO_2]

Reduction of company 2

Arbitrage

Em_2 CO_2 emissions [t]

Cap-and-Trade System

Equilibrium is found at $MAC_1(Em_1 - \delta) = MAC_2(Em_2 + \delta)$ for an emissions trade of δ tCO$_2$. Certificate price is set by intersection of MAC curves. Company 1 benefits since the price is higher than its abatement costs for the range $[Em_1 - \delta, Em_1]$; company 2 benefits since the price is below its abatement costs for the range $[Em_2, Em_2 + \delta]$.

The **Coase Theorem** says that in such a system, it doesn't matter how the initial certificates or emissions allowances are distributed to market participants; from the resulting trading, the system will still reach equilibrium at the socially optimum point, thus solving the problem of externalities and allocating resources efficiently.

The main thing is to have a recognised system of allowances.

However, benefits may be **distributed differently** depending on the initial allocation.

Relevance for EU emissions trading system (ETS): some certificates are sold by government, while others are allocated to industry for free (since they have to compete with foreign firms).

	Pigouvian Tax	**Cap-and-Trade**
Price	Set by government	Determined implicitly by MAC and cap
Volume	Determined implicitly by MAC and price	Set by government
Benefits	Price certainty for industry	Allows targetting of CO_2 volume precisely
Drawbacks	Can under- or overshoot CO_2 volume target	Can lead to price volatility

EU Emissions Trading System

Why an Emissions Trading System?

Answer: combination of advantages of Cap-and-Trade and ease of legislation.

For tax issues all EU member states must agree, but majority vote is sufficient for an Emissions Trading System (ETS) $\Rightarrow$ ETS was easier to legislate than a carbon tax.

The ETS is a mandatory Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Cap-and-Trade system for power, refinery, steel, glass, cement industries (2071 MtCO$_2$eq verified emissions in 2005, about 40% of total).

Included aviation within EEA from 2012. Desire to include maritime, buildings and transport soon.

(Emissions from buildings, road transport, agriculture, waste and small facilities covered by separate **Effort Sharing Regulation** (ESR).)

Almost free allocation of emission rights in the first two trading periods 2005-7 and 2008-12 led to **windfall profits**.

System is intended to become the prototype for a global Cap-and-Trade system.

ETS in context of total emissions

NB: EU now has net-zero 2050 target.

Source: Öko-Institut, 2014

Design of an Emissions Trading System

Trading period length of time:

- If the trading period is too long, the incentives are weak (e.g. decades).

- If the trading period is too short, there is lack of certainty for investments.

Allocation of emissions allowances:

- **Auctioning**, i.e. operators buy allowances in auctions. Government collects and redistributes auctioning revenues.

- **Free allocation** based on **grandfathering**, i.e. industries are given free allowances based on past emissions.

- **Free allocation** based on **benchmarking**, i.e. industries are given free allowances based on their activities (e.g. product sales) and a per-sector benchmark.

In past free allocation led to windfall profits, since CO_2 prices are opportunity costs of power plant operators (certificates could be sold) and, thus, included into the product price anyway.

Main features:

- 27 EU member states + Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein (UK has own ETS since 2021)
- Covers around 40% of EU GHG emissions ($\sim$ 2 billion tCO_2eq as of 2014)
- 4% of world's GHG emissions
- A quantitative limit is put on the aggregate annual amount of emissions for all plants participating in ETS (cap).
- A single EU-wide cap; allowances issued correspond to cap.
- Declining by 1.74% annually until 2020; 2021 onwards at 2.2% (up for reform).

EUA (EU Allowance): An EUA permits operators of an industry installation or electricity generation unit to emit 1 t of CO2 under the EU emissions trading system. Each regulated operator must surrender every year the amount of EUA corresponding to the amount of its emissions.

ETS Free Allowances and Auctioning

Auctioning as the main allocation principle:

- for energy utilities – since 2013

- for other industries – growing %, to be fully phased in by 2027

- free allocation to industries threatened by **carbon leakage**

Phases of ETS

Phase I (2005-7)

- Pilot phase for EU energy + industry
- Most allowances given for free; power sector based on fuel-specific benchamarks

Phase II (2008-12)

- Inclusion of EEA countries (NO, IS, LI) & aviation inside EEA
- Auctioning for power sector and product benchmarking for the other sectors

Phase III (2013-20)

- Move from free allowances to auctioning (particularly for energy)
- Linear reduction factor (LRF) for cap of 1.74% per year
- Introduction of market stability reserve (MSR) in 2019 to address low prices, remove surplus certificates and stabilise prices

26

EUA prices during Phases I-III

ICE EUA Futures Real Price

Phase I — Phase II — Phase III

Source: **Wikipedia**

Phase IV (2021-2030)

- Linear reduction factor (LRF) raised to 2.2% per year

- EU CO_2 emissions will be reduced by 2030 by 43% compared to 2005 levels

- New 2030 GHG target of -55% will require 61% reduction compared to 2005 according to Commission, so LRF will need to be adjusted

- Commission proposes to include maritime emissions

- Include buildings and road transport in medium term?

- Phase out of free allowances

EUA vs Front-Year Fuel Switching Price

Carbon price required to switch from coal to gas plant

Source: **Carbon Reporter**

EU ETS emissions cap assuming ETS extension to buildings and transport:

Source: Agora Energiewende, 2020

Market Stability Reserve

Market stability reserve (MSR) is intended to address weakness of ETS: strong price fluctuations and **waterbed effect**. The waterbed effect is the effect whereby it makes little sense for individual countries or sectors to make additional reduction efforts, since this only makes EUA cheaper for others.

Market stability reserve operating since January 2019:

- addresses the surplus of allowances
- improves the system's resilience to shocks (recessions, pandemics, etc.)

It triggers adjustments to annual auction volumes in situations where the total number of allowances in circulation is outside a predefined range:

- Reducing allowances from future auction volumes if the EU ETS surplus exceeds 833 million allowances
- Adding allowances to future auction volumes provided the EU ETS surplus is below 400 million allowances

Carbon Border Adjustment versus Carbon Clubs

How to deal with the fact that European industries must pay for carbon emissions but their goods must remain competitive with imports? There is a danger of **carbon leakage**, i.e. carbon-intensive industries moving to countries without carbon pricing.

- **Free allowances** for industries with products at risk of carbon leakage. This was the solution in EU until now.

- **Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)** that adds tariff on import of carbon-intensive products (like steel, electricity and ammonia) according to their emissions (based on benchmarking for each sector). This is the solution proposed by the European Commission in 2021.

- **Carbon Clubs** that allow free trading between partners with similar carbon reduction schemes. Has been **proposed** in October 2021 for US and EU trading clean steel and aluminium.