Energy System Modelling
Summer Semester 2018, Lecture 6

Dr. Tom Brown, tom.brown@kit.edu, https://nworbmot.org/
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Automation and Applied Informatics (IAI)

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1. Introduction to Electricity Markets

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Introduction to Electricity Markets
Given the many different ways of consuming and generating electricity:

- What is the **most efficient** way to deploy consuming and generating assets in the short-run?
- How should we invest in assets in the long-run to **maximise economic welfare**?

The operation of electricity markets is intimately related to **optimisation**.

In the past and still in many countries today, electricity was provided centrally by ‘vertically-integrated’ monopoly utilities that owned generating assets, the electricity networks and retailing. Given that these utilities owned all the infrastructure, it was hard for third-party generators to compete, even if they were allowed to.

From the 1980s onwards, countries began to liberalise their electricity sectors, separating generation from transmission, and allowing regulated competition for generation in **electricity markets**.
Electricity markets have several important differences compared to other commodity markets.

At every instant in time, consumption must be balanced with generation. If you throw a switch to turn on a light, somewhere a generator will be increasing its output to compensate.

If the power is not balanced in the grid, the power supply will collapse and there will be blackouts.

It is not possible to run an electricity market for every single second, for practical reasons (the network must be checked for stability, etc.). So electricity is traded in blocks of time, e.g. hourly, 14:00-15:00, or quarter-hourly, 14:00-14:15, well in advance of the time when it is actually consumed (based on forecasts).

Further markets trade in backup balancing power, which step in if the forecasts are wrong.
Load (= Electrical Demand) is low during night; in Northern Europe in the winter, the peak is in the evening.

To meet this load profile, cheap baseload generation runs the whole time; more expensive peaking plant covers the difference.
Effect of varying demand for fixed generation

Source: Tom Brown
Example market 1/3
Example market 2/3

Electricity generation in Germany [GW]

Spot price [€/MWh]
Electricity generation in Germany [GW]

- Nuclear
- Brown Coal
- Hard Coal
- Gas
- Hydro
- Biomass
- Wind
- Solar
- Exports

Spot price [€/MWh]

Example market 3/3
Effect of varying renewables: fixed demand, no wind
Effect of varying renewables: fixed demand, 35 GW wind
Spot market price development

As a result of so much zero-marginal-cost renewable feed-in, spot market prices have been steadily decreasing:

Source: Agora Energiewende
Optimisation Revision
Optimisation problem

We have an **objective function** \( f : \mathbb{R}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \)

\[
\max_x f(x)
\]

\([x = (x_1, \ldots, x_k)]\) subject to some **constraints** within \( \mathbb{R}^k \):

\[
\begin{align*}
g_i(x) &= c_i \quad \leftrightarrow \quad \lambda_i \quad i = 1, \ldots, n \\
h_j(x) &\leq d_j \quad \leftrightarrow \quad \mu_j \quad j = 1, \ldots, m
\end{align*}
\]

\(\lambda_i\) and \(\mu_j\) are the **KKT multipliers** (basically Lagrange multipliers) we introduce for each constraint equation; it measures the change in the objective value of the optimal solution obtained by relaxing the constraint (shadow price).
The **Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions** are necessary conditions that an optimal solution $x^*, \mu^*, \lambda^*$ always satisfies (up to some regularity conditions):

1. **Stationarity**: For $l = 1, \ldots, k$
   \[
   \frac{\partial L}{\partial x_l} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_l} - \sum_i \lambda^*_i \frac{\partial g_i}{\partial x_l} - \sum_j \mu^*_j \frac{\partial h_j}{\partial x_l} = 0
   \]

2. **Primal feasibility**:
   \[
   g_i(x^*) = c_i \quad \text{and} \quad h_j(x^*) \leq d_j
   \]

3. **Dual feasibility**: $\mu^*_j \geq 0$

4. **Complementary slackness**: $\mu^*_j (h_j(x^*) - d_j) = 0$
Electricity Markets from Perspective of Single Generators and Consumers
Assume investments already made in generators and and consumption assets (factories, machines, etc.).

Assume all actors are price takers (i.e. nobody can exercise market power) and we have perfect competition.

How do we allocate production and consumption in the most efficient way?

I.e. we are interested in the short-run “static” efficiency.

(In contrast to long-run “dynamic” efficiency where we also consider optimal investment in assets.)
Consider now the market from the point of view of a single generator.

A generator has a **cost or supply function** \( C(g) \) in €/h, which gives the total operating costs (of fuel, etc.) for a given rate of electricity generation \( g \) MW.

Typically the generator has a higher cost for a higher rate of generation \( g \), i.e. the first derivative is positive \( C'(g) > 0 \). For most generators the rate at which cost increases with rate of production itself increases as the rate of production increases, i.e. \( C''(g) > 0 \).
A gas generator has a cost function which depends on the rate of electricity generation $g$ [€/h] according to

$$C(g) = 0.005 \, g^2 + 9.3 \, g + 120$$

Note that the slope is always positive and becomes more positive for increasing $g$. The curve does not start at the origin because of startup costs, no load costs, etc.
Optimal generator behaviour

We assume that the generator is a **price-taker**, i.e. they cannot influence the price by changing the amount they generate.

Suppose the market price is $\lambda \text{ €/MWh}$. For a generation rate $g$, the revenue is $\lambda g$ and the generator should adjust their generation rate $g$ to maximise their **net generation surplus**, i.e. their profit:

$$\max_g [\lambda g - C(g)]$$

This optimisation problem is optimised for $g = g^*$ where

$$C'(g^*) \equiv \frac{dC}{dg}(g^*) = \lambda$$

[Check units: $\frac{dC}{dg}$ has units $\frac{€/h}{MW} = €/MWh$.]

i.e. the generator increases their output until they make a net loss for any increase of generation.

$C'(g)$ is known as the **marginal cost curve**, which shows, for each rate of generation $g$ what price $\lambda$ the generator should be willing to supply at.
For our example the marginal function is given by

\[ C'(g) = 0.001 \ g + 9.3 \]
The area under the curve is generator costs, which as the integral of a derivative, just gives the cost function $C(g)$ again, up to a constant.

The **generator surplus** is the profit the generator makes by having costs below the electricity price.
Limits to generation

Note that it is quite common for generators to be limited by e.g. their capacity $G$, which may become a **binding**, i.e. limiting factor before the price plays a role, e.g.

$$g \leq G \leftrightarrow \mu$$

In the following case the optimal generation is at $g^* = G = 250$ MW. We have a **binding** constraint and can define a **shadow price** $\mu$, which indicates the benefit of relaxing the constraint $\mu^* = \lambda - C'(g^*)$. 

![Diagram showing marginal cost function and electricity price](image-url)
Suppose for some given period a consumer consumes electricity at a rate of $d$ MW.

Their **utility or value function** $U(d)$ in €/h is a measure of their benefit for a given consumption rate $d$.

For a firm this could be the profit related to this electricity consumption from manufacturing goods.

Typical the consumer has a higher utility for higher $d$, i.e. the first derivative is positive $U'(d) > 0$. By assumption, the rate of value increase with consumption decreases the higher the rate of consumption, i.e. $U''(d) < 0$. 

Utility: Example

A widget manufacturer has a utility function which depends on the rate of electricity consumption \( d \) [€/h] as

\[
U(d) = 0.0667 \, d^3 - 8 \, d^2 + 300 \, d
\]

Note that the slope is always positive, but becomes less positive for increasing \( d \).
Optimal consumer behaviour

We assume that the consumer is a price-taker, i.e. they cannot influence the price by changing the amount they consume.

Suppose the market price is $\lambda \, \text{€/MWh}$. The consumer should adjust their consumption rate $d$ to maximise their net surplus

$$\max_d [U(d) - \lambda d]$$

This optimisation problem is optimised for $d = d^*$ where

$$U'(d^*) \equiv \frac{dU}{dd}(d^*) = \lambda$$

[Check units: $\frac{dU}{dd}$ has units $\frac{\text{€/h}}{\text{MW}} = \text{€/MWh}$.] I.e. the consumer increases their consumption until they make a net loss for any increase of consumption.

$U'(d)$ is known as the inverse demand curve or marginal utility curve, which shows, for each rate of consumption $d$ what price $\lambda$ the consumer should be willing to pay.
Inverse demand function: Example

For our example the inverse demand function is given by

\[ U'(d) = 0.2 \ d^2 - 16 \ d + 300 \]

It's called the inverse demand function, because the demand function is the function you get from reversing the axes.
The **demand function** $D(\lambda)$ gives the demand $d$ as a function of the price $\lambda$. $D(U'(d)) = d$.

For our example the demand function is given by

$$D(\lambda) = -((\lambda + 20)/0.2)^{0.5} + 40$$
The area under the inverse demand curve is the **gross consumer surplus**, which as the integral of a derivative, just gives the utility function $U(d)$ again, up to a constant.
Net consumer surplus

The more relevant **net consumer surplus**, or just **consumer surplus** is the net gain the consumer makes by having utility above the electricity price.
Limits to consumption

Note that it is quite common for consumption to be limited by other factors before the electricity price becomes too expensive, e.g. due to the size of electrical machinery. This gives an upper bound

\[ d \leq D \leftrightarrow \mu \]

In the following case the optimal consumption is at \( d^* = D = 10 \text{ MW} \). We have a **binding** constraint and can define a **shadow price** \( \mu \), which indicates the benefit of relaxing the constraint \( \mu^* = U'(d^*) - \lambda \).
Consumers can delay their consumption

Besides changing the amount of electricity consumption, consumers can also shift their consumption in time.

For example electric storage heaters use cheap electricity at night to generate heat and then store it for daytime.

The LHC particle accelerator does not run in the winter, when prices are higher (see http://home.cern/about/engineering/powering-cern). Summer demand: 200 MW, corresponds to a third of Geneva, equal to peak demand of Rwanda (!); winter only 80 MW.
Aluminium smelting is an electricity-intensive process. Aluminium smelters will often move to locations with cheap and stable electricity supplies, such as countries with lots of hydroelectric power. For example, 73% of Iceland’s total power consumption in 2010 came from aluminium smelting.

Aluminium costs around US$ 1500/ tonne to produce.

Electricity consumption: 15 MWh/tonne.

At Germany consumer price of €300 / MWh, this is €4500 / tonne. Uh-oh!!!

If electricity is 50% of cost, then need $750/tonne to go on electricity ⇒ 750/15 $/MWh = 50 $/MWh.
Generators: A generator has a cost or supply function $C(g)$ in €/h, which gives the costs (of fuel, etc.) for a given rate of electricity generation $g$ MW. If the market price is $\lambda$ €/MWh, the revenue is $\lambda g$ and the generator should adjust their generation rate $g$ to maximise their net generation surplus, i.e. their profit:

$$\max_g [\lambda g - C(g)]$$

Consumers: Their utility or value function $U(d)$ in €/h is a measure of their benefit for a given consumption rate $d$. For a given price $\lambda$ they adjust their consumption rate $d$ such that their net surplus is maximised:

$$\max_d [U(d) - \lambda d]$$
Supply and Demand at a Single Node
Setting the quantity and price

**Total welfare** (consumer and generator surplus) is maximised if the total quantity is set where the marginal cost and marginal utility curves meet. If the price is also set from this point, then the individual optimal actions of each actor will achieve this result in a perfect decentralised market.

![Graph showing the relationship between electricity amount and cost, with shaded areas representing consumer surplus and producer surplus, and the market price set at 5 €/MWh.](image-url)
This is the result of maximising the **total economic welfare**, the sum of the consumer and the producer surplus for consumers $b$ with consumption $d_b$ and generators $s$ generating with rate $g_s$:

$$
\max_{\{d_b\},\{g_s\}} \left[ \sum_b U_b(d_b) - \sum_s C_s(g_s) \right]
$$

subject to the supply equalling the demand in the balance constraint:

$$
\sum_b d_b - \sum_s g_s = 0 \quad \leftrightarrow \quad \lambda
$$

and any other constraints (e.g. limits on generator capacity, etc.).

Market price $\lambda$ is the shadow price of the balance constraint, i.e. the cost of supply an extra increment 1 MW of demand.
We will now show our main result:

**Welfare-maximisation through decentralised markets**

The welfare-maximising combination of production and consumption can be achieved by the decentralised profit-maximising decisions of producers and the utility-maximising decisions of consumers, provided that:

- The market price is equal to the constraint marginal value of the overall supply-balance constraint in the welfare maximisation problem
- All producers and consumers are price-takers
Apply KKT now to maximisation of total economic welfare:

$$\max_{\{d_b\},\{g_s\}} f(\{d_b\}, \{g_s\}) = \left[ \sum_b U_b(d_b) - \sum_s C_s(g_s) \right]$$

subject to the balance constraint:

$$g(\{d_b\}, \{g_s\}) = \sum_b d_b - \sum_s g_s = 0 \iff \lambda$$

and any other constraints (e.g. limits on generator capacity, etc.).

Our optimisation variables are \( \{x\} = \{d_b\} \cup \{g_s\} \).

We get from stationarity:

$$0 = \frac{\partial f}{\partial d_b} - \sum_b \lambda^* \frac{\partial g}{\partial d_b} = U'_b(d_b) - \lambda^* = 0$$

$$0 = \frac{\partial f}{\partial g_s} - \sum_s \lambda^* \frac{\partial g}{\partial g_s} = -C'_s(g_s) + \lambda^* = 0$$
So at the optimal point of maximal total economic welfare we get the same result as if everyone maximises their own welfare separately:

\[ U'_b(d_b) = \lambda^* \]
\[ C'_s(g_s) = \lambda^* \]

This is the CENTRAL result of microeconomics.

If we have further inequality constraints that are binding, then these equations will receive additions with \( \mu_i^* > 0 \).
Here’s the forecast of load, wind, solar and conventional generation right now in Germany (link):
Here's the supply-demand curve for Germany-Austria right now (link)
Effect of varying demand for fixed generation

Source: Tom Brown
Electricity generation in Germany [GW]

- Nuclear
- Brown Coal
- Hard Coal
- Gas
- Hydro
- Biomass
- Wind
- Solar
- Exports

Spot price [€/MWh]
Effect of varying renewables: fixed demand, no wind
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As a result of so much zero-marginal-cost renewable feed-in, spot market prices have been steadily decreasing:

Source: Agora Energiewende
To summarise:

- Renewables have zero marginal cost
- As a result they enter at the bottom of the merit order, reducing the price at which the market clears
- This pushes non-CHP gas and hard coal out of the market
- This is unfortunate, because among the fossil fuels, gas and hard coal are the most flexible and produce the lowest CO$_2$ per MWh
- It also massively reduces the profits that nuclear and brown coal make
- Will there be enough backup power plants for times with no wind/solar?

This has led to lots of political tension...